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FOOD DISPARAGEMENT
— by Neil E. Harl*
The case against Oprah Winfrey, brought by a group of
Texas cattle feeders, has focused attention on a movement
that has been quietly spreading through the states—the
enactment of food disparagement statutes.1  To date, about
one-fourth of the states have enacted such statutes2 with
several more states considering similar legislation.3  In two
states,  Colorado and Delaware, statutes passed by the
state legislature were vetoed by the governors.4  On
February 18, 1998, the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Texas dismissed the count alleging
violation of the food disparagement statute.
Nature of the legislation
Although no two statutes are precisely identical, the
food disparagement legislation exhibits similar provisions.
Indeed, it has been reported5 that the legislation was
drafted as a model bill by a Washington, D.C. law firm
hired by the American Feed Industry Association.  The
same article indicated that state chapters of the American
Farm Bureau “began agitating for passage.”6
The Texas statute, which is typical of those enacted,
provides that a person is liable if— (1) the person
disseminates in any manner information relating to a
perishable food product to the public; (2) the person
knows the information is false; and (3) the information
states or implies that the perishable food product is not
safe for consumption by the public.7  The person is liable
to the producers of the product for damages and “any
other appropriate relief” arising from the person’s
dissemination of the information.8
The statute goes on to state that in determining whether
the information is false, the trier of fact is to consider
whether the information was based on “reasonable and
reliable scientific inquiry, facts or data.”9  Finally, the
Texas legislation defines “perishable food product” to
mean “a food product of agriculture or aquaculture that is
sold or distributed in a form that will perish or decay
beyond marketability within a limited period of time.”10
____________________________________________________
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As noted,11 the statutes differ in several significant
respects.  The Florida statute12 is more direct as to the
specification of falsity in stating that false information “is
that information which is not based on reliable, scientific
facts and reliable, scientific data.”13  The Florida
legislation also defines “disparagement” in terms of
“willful or malicious dissemination” of false
information.1 4  The Arizona law requires that the
individual, to be liable, must have “intentionally”
disseminated false information about a perishable
agricultural food product.15  South Dakota law states that a
person “who disparages a perishable agricultural food
product with intent to harm the producer” can be held
liable for treble damages.16
Reasons for the statutes
The statutes appear to have been enacted in response to
the so-called “Alar” scare of 1989.17  The CBS news
program, “60 Minutes,” had reported on a 1989 report of
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in which
the NRDC took the position that young children faced
increased dangers from pesticide use such as with a
herbicide known as Alar when applied to apples.18  The
report was supported by scientific research19 and had been
preceded by consumer concerns and boycotts three years
earlier.20
Washington apple growers filed suit against the
NRDC, CBS and CBS affiliates carrying the broadcast in
the State of Washington.  That suit was dismissed by the
Washington federal district court on the grounds that the
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that the
broadcast was verifiably false.21
The disparagement statutes were apparently drafted in
response to the judicial disposition of the Alar complaints
by producers.
Constitutionality
The major issue with the food disparagement statutes
is whether such legislation is constitutional.  The U.S.
Constitution states that “Congress shall make no
law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...”22
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with the provision also applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The common law tort of product disparagement
generally required the plaintiff to prove that (1) the
statement was communicated or published to a third
person, (2) the statement played a material and substantial
part in inducing others not to deal with the plaintiff, (3)
the statement was false and (4) the defendant acted with
wrongful intent or malice.23  Some courts have adopted the
Second Restatement of Torts analysis which requires that
the plaintiff establish that publication of the statement
would cause harm, that the harm was intended or that the
defendant knew the statement was false but published the
statement in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.
Some commentators argue that food disparagement
legislation should be viewed as dealing with a matter of
great public interest and concern and that the statutes
should be assessed on the basis of defamation
jurisprudence24 with the probable requirement that
plaintiffs must prove a statement’s falsity.  A number of
the state statutes have seemingly ignored this
requirement.25  That raises troubling constitutional issues
in those states.  The Texas statute, by requiring that the
alleged disparager “knows” the information is false,26 is
less affected by that infirmity.
Further litigation will be necessary for the
constitutional standing of the various statutes to be
ascertained.
From a broader policy perspective, a good argument
can be made that society is best served by rules which
allow open, robust debate on matters of great public
interest and concern.  Food safety clearly falls into that
category.
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AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS. The debtor was a
producer of soybean seed and had contracted with a
dealer to produce soybean seed from foundation seed
owned by the dealer. The debtor also contracted with
several growers to grow the seed. The debtor was to
receive a premium on each bushel of seed delivered to
the dealer and paid a premium to the growers out of the
premium received from the dealer. The debtor lost its
state grain license and its business was operated under
the state Department of Agriculture for the purpose of
winding up the debtor's affairs. Although most of the
